6th July 1988

Many of those living in Aberdeen and the surrounding area were woken up by the sound of helicopters flying over their houses, flying to the largest offshore oil piping disaster that the world has ever seen. The crew of the Piper Alpha platform consisted of 230 men. Only 63 were to make it out of the Piper that night. This article is a tribute to those who never managed to get out due to the negligence of their employers.

On the morning of the accident, pump A’s pressure safety valve was released for routine maintenance, as the pump’s fortnightly overhaul was planned but had not yet been started. The open Condensate pipe was for the time being sealed with a flat metal disc. Due to the fact the work could not be finished until 6 pm, the metal disc remained in place. The engineer on duty filled out a permit in which it was declared that the pump was not to be turned on under any circumstances whatsoever.

By the time the day shift and ended night shift began, with 62 men running the Piper Alpha, the engineer found the on-duty custodian. The engineer neglected to inform him of the metal plate in pump A. He went on to place the permit in the control centre before leaving. The permit disappeared and was never found again. Another permit was issued for the overhaul of pump A that had not yet started.

Piper Alpha had an automatic fire-fighting system, which was driven by both diesel and electric pumps. The electric pumps would be disabled by the coming explosions. The diesel pumps would suck in water from the sea and would be used in the fire- fighting. However if divers were working in the water below the platform these pumps would be set to go on manual. Other platforms had a set-up whereby the diesel pumps were only set to manual if the divers were working in the direct vicinity of the pumps, so as to stop them being sucked in with the water. However, for no apparent reason, on the Piper Alpha platform it was dictated that the pumps needed be set on manual whenever the divers were in the water, without regard to their location. Due to this regulation, the diesel pipes were set to manual on the evening of July the 6th.

At around 21:45 hours, Condensate pump B suddenly stopped working, and could not be restarted for some reason. The power supply of the entire offshore construction depended on that pump. This gave the manager only a few minutes to get the pump back online, or the station’s power supply would fail completely. A search was immediately begun so the manager could see as to whether Condensate pump A could be started. The permit for the overhaul was found a few minutes later. However the permit stating that under no circumstances could pump A could be started was lost.

The safety valve was in a different place from the pump and, due to the fact that in Piper Alpha they sorted things by location, the missing valve was placed in a different location. As a result of this, no one noticed that the valve was missing. The gas began to flow, and it produced a pressure that the safety valve could not withstand. This drew the attention of several men, in addition to setting off six gas alarms including a high level one. Tragically, it was too late - the gas ignited and exploded. The walls in Piper Alpha were not designed to handle explosions. This then caused the panels around module B to become dislodged, and a small Condensate pipe was ruptured creating another fire.

By around five past ten, Piper Alpha’s control room had been destroyed. The design of the platform had made absolutely no allowances for the destruction of the control room. As a result of this, no call for evacuation was made or even attempted by using the loudspeakers.

The safety procedures in Piper Alpha specified that personnel were to make their way to the lifeboat stations. However this was made impossible due to the fire. As a result of this, the men moved to the fireproofed accommodation block beneath the helicopter pad. When the smoke began to penetrate the accommodation block two men heroically donned protective gear, in an attempt to reach the fire-fighting systems below the deck, in an attempt to reach the diesel pumping station. These men were never seen again.

Even more tragically, the fire itself would have burnt out had it not been fed by the nearby Tartan and Claymore platforms hurtling gas and oil into the heart of the fire. The Claymore platform was only shut down after the second explosion, because the manager feared reprisals from his superiors. The Tartan platform was not shut down due to the cost that would be involved in doing such an action; the profits were valued above the lives of the oil workers.

At around twenty past ten the Tartan’s gas line burst. This now had made certain the utter destruction of platform Alpha. In the region of 20 tonnes of gas was released instantaneously and ignited a massive fireball that engulfed the platform Alpha. This presented those left on the platform with a brutal choice; stay on the deck and face the possibility of dying by another explosion or hurl themselves into the freezing North Sea, which itself was burning.

By around half-past ten, the Tharos fire-fighting and rescue platform, began to extend its walkway 30 meters over to the deck of Piper Alpha. However due to a design flaw in the Tharos the walkway took around twenty minutes to get over to the Piper Alpha platform, giving many of those still on the platform further incentive to jump into the North Sea.

By around twenty past eleven the pipeline connecting Piper Alpha to the Claymore platform burst, and the disaster finally had taken its last victims. At around 24.00 hours the generations’ and utilities’ module slipped into the sea. By 01.00 hours the entire platform had sunk into the sea along with the charred bodies of 163 oil workers.

The Aftermath of the Tragedy

There was a huge amount of criticism of Occidental Petroleum who owned the platform, and controversy as to whether there was sufficient time for an evacuation of Piper Alpha. Questions were also raised as to whether the explosion and the chaos that ensued afterwards was a general consequence of the design of the platform. Most notably the absence of blast walls meant in the circumstances there was no way of preventing such a tragedy. In the aftermath of the incident the Offshore Industry Liaison Committee, described as the first post-Margaret Thatcher trade union, was created to represent the interests of workers on oil rigs.

The 167 men killed in Piper Alpha were killed needlessly and as a direct result of the negligence of the company in question. In the final analysis it was the company’s thirst for profit that won over the expense of the lives of the workers. If proper safety provision had been in place, such a disaster would have been entirely avoidable. Sadly the Piper Alpha disaster is but one of many examples of such greed. Every year more workers are killed at work than in wars. The memories of those killed on Piper Alpha must be preserved as we struggle for a socialist society in which the health and safety of workers will never be a secondary priority.