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The rate of profit since the Second World War
We are going to try to test the theories against ‘the
facts'. The facts in this case are the record of economic statistics. Economic
statistics are drawn up, for the most part, by honest people. With few
exceptions, none are Marxists. They don't think in Marxist categories. For
instance we saw earlier how Marx divided the value of a commodity into constant
capital, variable and surplus value. Variable capital is outlay on wages,
constant capital on all the other costs and surplus value is rent, interest and
profit. These categories are needed to work out the rate of profit in Marxist
terms, as we find out later.
This division does not concern the capitalist, or the
economic statistician. The individual capitalist is more concerned as to
whether he recovers his capital at the end of the production period (which is
true both of wages and raw materials costs - together called circulating
capital) or whether it is tied up as fixed capital (which means it can take
years to get his money back). These are the concepts captured in economic
statistics. Marx's categories just disappear from the statistical record. They
can be quite difficult to recover.
The profit share can be measured as a proportion of
national income. National income is a flow of revenues usually measured over a
year. For our purposes Gross National Product and Gross Domestic Product can be
regarded as the same thing as National Income (though there are some
differences). Deduct the share of wages
and other factor income flows from national income as a whole and the profit
share is what is left. It can be presented as P/Y, when profit is P and
national income is Y.
The rate of profit is more difficult to work out than
the share. It is shown as P/K where K is the capital stock. It is necessary to
make sure the source of the stock figures for K are compatible with the flow
figures for Y, and that they are compiled in the same way.
For Marx the rate of profit is calculated against the entire
capital stock, whether used up over a year or not. One way to work out the rate
of profit is to multiply the profit share by the output/capital ratio (Y/K).
P/Y x Y/K gives you P/K (dividing both denominator and numerator by Y).
The rate of profit has been the heartbeat of capitalism
throughout the whole period we are investigating. Generally speaking, periods
when the rate of profit has been high have been periods when investment has
been high (a rapid rate of capital accumulation), and periods of relatively
high employment. All these generalisations refer to the advanced capitalist
countries. These are the only countries with consistent and accurate statistics
for the whole period. But these, after all, are the heartlands of capitalism
that contribute so much to the rhythms of global capital accumulation.
Andrew Glyn and his fellow authors first made their name by
analysing the emerging crisis of capitalism in the 1970s in terms of a profits
squeeze. To identify this profits squeeze they looked at the rate of profit,
but also at the share of profit in the national income.
Let us look first at the evidence from Capitalism since
1945 (Armstrong, Glyn and Harrison). This in turn is based on earlier,
pioneering works such as British capitalism, workers and the profits squeeze
(Glyn and Sutcliffe). This team of authors were the first to identify the
centrality of the profit rate in the evolution of global capitalism since the
Second World War.
Armstrong et al. also deal with the profit share
(which is easier to measure). There is a difference between the profit rate and
the profit share, but one important and obvious reason the profit share might
increase or decrease is because the rate of profit has gone up or down - so
there is also a connection. Armstrong's central thesis was that the profit
share was squeezed by militant workers, and that this was the basic cause of
the breakdown of the ‘golden years' after World War II. Our historic critique
of their position can be found at The
tendency for the rate of profit to fall and post-war capitalism - AG and
MB.
On page 8, Armstrong et al. deal with the increase of
investment as a result of the War. "In Japan throughout the period 1939-44
private industrial investment ran at around the rate of the mid-thirties. In
Germany between 1936 and 1943 the volume of investment in industry grew
continuously to an unprecedented level....In the United States investment grew
rapidly during the early years of the war. The peak in 1941, however, still represented
a lower level than that achieved in 1929, and it then declined and stayed at a
rather low level (less than half the 1929 peak) for the remainder of the war.
Investment in plant and machinery in the United Kingdom rose by nearly one-half
between 1938 and 1940, but then declined to well below half the previous rate
for the last three years of the war."
So far, then, investment was recovering from the Great
Depression as a result of the open-handed arms spending by the warring states.
Rates of profit were extremely high throughout the War in the fascist
countries, as the authors point out, because of the repression of the labour
movement.
Post-War chaos and devastation at first held the economies
back. Despite the ‘advantages' of fascism in Italy, "the low level of capacity
utilisation, especially in 1946, substantially increased overheads, such as
depreciation. Overall the share of profits in industrial output in 1947 can
hardly have been much below that in 1938." (ibid. p.53).
In Japan the profit share rose year on year from 1947-1951
from 8%, to 9%, to 15% to 22%, to 26% (ibid p. 91). In Germany "profits were
high" (ibid p. 97). A graph shows industrial production, industrial employment
and industrial productivity increasing by leaps and bounds after the War.
The authors sum up the causes of the post-War recovery. "The
balance between wages and productivity was extremely favourable to the
employers. Profits were comparable to prewar levels even in the countries then
under fascism" (p. 105). The revival of the possibility of profitable
production was a precondition of the great post-War boom.
Throughout what the authors call the ‘golden years', the
rate of profit was in gentle decline. This was not a straight-line movement, of
course. The rate of profit went down in years of downturn and revived in the
upturn. There continued to be a cycle of boom and slump, but it was much more
moderate over this period. The rate of profit did revive after each downswing,
but did not generally recover its previous peak. So the graph lines for Europe,
the United States, Japan and the advanced capitalist countries as a whole show
profit rates dipping as we approach 1974, the year of the first generalised
post-War crisis of capitalism. Diagrammatically, the movement in the rate of
profit resembles the teeth of a saw that tapers downwards.
At bottom, as we show later, the 1974 crisis was not an oil
crisis, or an inflation crisis: it was a crisis of profitability. In a diagram
on p. 251 Armstrong shows manufacturing profit rates in Europe, Japan and the
USA recovering after 1974, but never returning to the levels seen in the
‘golden years'.
We will now pass the torch to Robert Brenner. Brenner wrote
an article entitled The economics of global turbulence, which took up
the whole issue of New Left Review issue 229, May/June 1998. He effectively
updated his analysis in a book, The boom and the bubble,
published in 2002. We have criticisms of Brenner's analysis, as we have of Glyn
and his colleagues. Our critique of Brenner is at Rate of profit and
capitalist crisis. Brenner's writings are undoubtedly the most
authoritative on the world economy within the Marxist tradition over the last
ten years, as Armstrong, Glyn and Harrison's were for the earlier period. The
statistical analysis of both sets of writing is usually unassailable - but see
the Appendix.
In his earlier work
Brenner begins, "Between 1970 and 1990, the manufacturing rate of profit for
the G-7 economies taken together (the biggest capitalist economies) was on
average about 40% lower than between 1950 and 1970...the radical decline in the
profit rate has been the basic cause of the parallel, major decline in the
growth of investment and with it the growth of output, especially in
manufacturing over the same period. The sharp decline in the rate of growth of
investment - along with that of output itself is - I shall argue, the primary
source of the decline in the rate of growth of productivity, as well as the
major determinant of the increase of unemployment. The reductions in the rate
of profit and of the growth of productivity are at the root of the sharp
slowdown in the growth of real wages." (p. 7-8). This is Brenner's central
thesis. And we agree with him. What we need to find out is why this happened.
On page 8 of The boom and the bubble Brenner has a
diagram showing the fall in average profits in the 1970-1993 period compared
with the golden years of 1950 - 1970. The US sees falls from 24.3% to 14.5%,
Germany 23.1% to 10.9%, Japan 40.4% to 20.4% and the G-7 as a whole from 26.2%
to 15.7%. Moreover output, net capital stock, gross capital stock, labour
productivity and the real wage all follow the trend set by the net profit rate.
It is clear that profit determines the whole rhythm of capital accumulation.
How Glyn explains the falling profit rate
Glyn et al. suggested that the profit share was falling
because of the rising share of national income that went to wages. Class
struggle explained the crisis! For a time their explanation seemed to fit the
facts, but the Marxists remained unconvinced. After all, the 1970s was a period
of sharply fought class struggle. Here is Brenner's criticism of the profits
squeeze thesis. (These points are taken unchanged from our critique of Brenner,
Rate of profit and capitalist crisis.)
First ‘the universality of the long downturn'.
"...none of the advanced capitalist economies was able to escape the long
downturn. Neither the weakest economies with the strongest labour movements,
like Great Britain, nor the strongest economies with the weakest labour
movements, like Japan, remained immune." (1998 p.22)
Second ‘the
simultaneity of the onset and various phases'. "The advanced capitalist
economies experienced the onset of the long downturn at the same moment -
between 1965 and 1973. These economies have, moreover, experienced the
successive stages of the long downturn more or less in lock step, sustaining
simultaneous recessions in 1970-1, 1974-75, 1979-82 and from 1990-91." (ibid.
p.22) How is it possible, Brenner asks, for the different course of the class
struggle in different countries to produce these global trends?
Last, ‘the length of
the downturn'. "Finally, the fact that the downturn has gone on for so very
long would seem to be fatal for the supply-side approach."..."it is almost impossible
to believe that the assertion of workers' power has been both so effective and
so unyielding as to have caused the downturn to continue over a period of close
to a quarter century." (ibid. p.22)
These are trenchant arguments. They are arguments in the
spirit of Marx himself. Marx said, "To put it mathematically: the rate of
accumulation is the independent, not the dependent variable; the rate of wages
is the dependent, not the independent variable." (Capital Volume I p. 770)
Marx realized that workers were in a stronger bargaining
position with relatively full employment and could push wages up. They were
under the cosh in a recession, with hundreds prepared to take their job for
less pay if the alternative was unemployment. But the ups and downs of wages
mirror the ups and downs of capitalism, they do not cause them.
Marx and the tendency for the rate of profit to fall
In Capital Volume III
Marx wrote three chapters on The law of the tendential fall in the rate
of profit. They are The law in itself (ch. 13), Counteracting
factors (ch. 14) and Development of the laws's internal contradictions
(ch 15). This law is also referred to in the Grundrisse, where Marx
describes it as "in every respect the most important law of modern economy and
the most essential for understanding the most difficult relations. It is the
most important law from the historical standpoint. It is a law which, despite
its simplicity, has never before been grasped and, even less, consciously
articulated" (p. 748). We shall argue that Marx was right and that crisis in
the post-War capitalist economy can be explained in terms of Marx's theory.
We are assuming here that the reader has a basic grasp of
the process of extraction of surplus value (exploitation), at least in outline,
as explained in Capital Volume I and in pamphlets such as Wage labour
and capital and Wages, price and profit. Why, in view of its
importance, does Marx wait till Volume III (which was not published in his
lifetime) to explain this law? The answer lies in Marx's method. Rosdolsky, in The
making of Marx's Capital, gives what we believe to be a definitive account
of Marx's plan for his work on Capital. In 1865-66 he came up with a four
volume project:
- Book
I Production process of
capital
- Book
II Circulation process of
capital
- Book
III Forms of the process as a
whole
- Book
IV The history of theory (This
became the three volumes of Theories of surplus value)
(Rosdolsky p. 13)
So before he can explain the tendency for the rate of profit
to fall, Marx has to show how the drive by individual capitalists to maximise
their own profits leads to the emergence of a general rate of profit. We shall
do the same. These issues are to be dealt with in the discussion of capitalist
production as a whole.
The formation of a general rate of profit
Marx divides the value of a commodity into constant capital
such as plant and raw materials (c), variable capital which is the outlay on
wages (v) and surplus value, conventionally divided into rent, interest and
profit (s). The capitalist doesn't care about all this stuff about c + v + s.
All he knows is that he lays out a sum of money at the start of the production
process and ends up with more (this circuit of capital is money - commodity -
more money or M - C - M'). So he calculates his total capital regardless as to whether it is spent on
constant or variable capital. (We shall call total capital C in accordance with
Marx's usage. Note that we earlier symbolised it as K, as is usual in national
income accounting.)
The capitalist works out his rate of profit based on total
capital. The individual capitalist is not interested in the origins of surplus
value. Indeed in his account books, and in the consciousness of the capitalist
class, surplus value disappears as a separate category altogether.
One important observation from this is that the capitalists
can sell their commodities below their value and still make a profit.
Capitalists are continually trying to undercut one another, concerned as they
are with market share and trying to win the war of competition. This still
further pushes the origins of surplus value out of vision.
We have to be careful here. When we dealt with the value of
a commodity, we resolved it into c + v + s. Now c (constant capital) consisted
of two parts: fixed and circulating capital. The capitalist keeps separate
records of the two, for they have consequences as to how he spends his precious
money. This distinction between fixed and circulating capital (with wages seen
as just another part of circulating capital) is another reason why the origins
of surplus value are obscured. Circulating constant capital passes its entire
value to the final product. An example would be the chocolate sprayed on to a
Mars bar. We are mainly talking about raw materials here. It is fairly obvious
that the chocolate is constant capital in the sense that it only passes its own
value to the chocolate bar. It does not magically add value to the final
product.
Then there is fixed constant capital, such as plant and
machinery. When we examine the value of a commodity, we realised that a machine
may help to produce millions of commodities and does not pass all its value to
each one. The value it passes on can be explained by the notion of
depreciation. The machine costs £1 million and produces a million commodities
and is then worn out. We can assume that it passes value of £1 to each
commodity it helps us produce. If the capitalist charges £1 depreciation in
calculating the costs of each commodity, and puts £1 aside every time one is sold,
he will have enough money to buy a new machine when it wears out. It is quite
likely that the ‘straight line' depreciation we have suggested is simplistic.
The machine may become out of date before it wears out. Like buying a new car,
its resale value may decline sharply as soon as the workers start using it. For
now all we need to establish is that it is the depreciation of fixed constant
capital that contributes to the value of the commodity.
But it is a different matter when the capitalist comes to think
about his profits, which he calculates against his total capital (C). The whole
point about the investment in fixed constant capital is that it locks away his
money for years. So the rate of profit is calculated on the total capital
advanced, whether used up or not.
The rate of profit is therefore s/C - surplus value divided
by total capital. We are still assuming that all the surplus value is taken by
the manufacturing capitalist at this stage. But remember that rent and
interest, incomes which go to other sections of the ruling class, all come from
the unpaid labour of the working class.
How is the rate of profit determined within an industry? An
industry standard of technology is established by competition among the
existing firms. Firms either keep up by producing commodities at the socially
necessary labour time prevailing at the time, or they go to the wall.
Occasionally laggard firms can maintain a fly-by-night existence if they have
access to cheaper labour or some other advantage to compensate for their lack
of productivity. But generally you don't have farming with ploughs and oxen
competing with farming conducted with combine harvesters. We may regard the
achievement of higher productivity by accumulating capital and applying
relatively more fixed capital in the form of machinery etc. to the production
process as a basic tendency of capitalism.
Though technology and productivity may be standardised
within an industry, it is obvious that different industries have very different
levels of technology from one another. What is important from the Marxist point
of view is that they therefore have very different organic compositions of
capital.
The organic composition of capital measures the ratio of
constant to variable capital in the production process or the proportion of
dead to living labour. It is often presented symbolically as c/v. Now let's
look at an apparent problem when we have capitals of different organic
compositions in different industries.
To keep things as simple as possible we will assume that the
rate of exploitation is the same in both industries. We will also assume that
all the fixed constant capital is used up over the production period we are
studying, one year. There are only two industries in our simplified model:
I c350 + v50 +s50. Profit rate = 50/400
= 12½%
II c50 + v50 + s50. Profit rate = 50/100 = 50%
So the same rate of surplus value produces a very different
rate of profit depending on the different organic composition of capital in
different industries. But this contradicts everything we know about the nature
of capitalism. Capitalism is production for profit. The rate of profit is the
central determinant of capital flows. Marx was well aware of this when he
outlined the labour theory of value in Capital
Volume I. In Volume III he explained that the consequence of the formation
of an economy-wide rate of profit was that surplus value was redistributed
between the different industrial sectors. As a result commodities are sold at
money prices tending to their prices of production, a modified value.
"The whole difficulty arises from the fact that commodities
are not exchanged simply as commodities but as products of capitals,
which claim shares in the total mass of surplus value according to their size,
equal shares for equal size" (Capital Volume III p. 275)
In our simplified economy, equalisation of the rate of
profit, through the flow of capital from the sector with the lower rate of
profit to the sector with a higher rate, would produce the following result:
I c350 + v50 + p80 (profit rate = 80/400 = 20%) (where p is
profit)
II c50 + v50 + p20 (profit rate = 20/100 = 20%)
So in industry I, output of 450 in values has been
transformed into 480 in prices of production. In industry II, output of 150 in
values has been transformed into 120 in prices of production. Surplus value has
been transferred from industry II with a lower organic composition of capital
to industry I with a higher organic composition.
One way Marx explains this is by asking us to think of a
workplace with two departments, both necessary to produce the commodity. The
capitalist who owns them doesn't actually care where the surplus comes from as
long as he gets his hands on it.
Marx concludes therefore that commodities are not actually
sold at prices corresponding to their values, but tend to their prices of
production, a modified value. In the example above, commodities in industry I
are sold above their value and commodities in II below their value. But total
values are equal to total prices of production and total surplus value is equal
to total profit.
Does this contradict the law of value? Marx presents the
process as a historical development. "The exchange of commodities at their
values, or at approximately these values, thus corresponds to a much lower
stage of development than exchange at prices of production, for which a
definite degree of capitalist development is needed" (ibid. p. 277). In
the same way, when we look at the labour theory of value, we start off with
simple commodity production, and then move on to look at wage labour and
capital.
The increasing organic composition of capital
The organic composition of capital measures the ratio of
living to dead labour in the production process. To remind ourselves, "By the
composition of capital we mean...the ratio between its active and passive
component, between variable and constant capital." (Capital Volume III
p. 244) Marx adds, "The organic composition of capital is the name we give to
its value composition, in so far as this is determined by its technical
composition and reflects it." (ibid. p. 245).
We have seen how
there is a tendency for a uniform rate of profit to be established throughout
the economy, despite the differing organic compositions of capital within
different branches of industry. This tendency, like any other tendency under
capitalism, emerges precisely through individual capitalists searching for a
higher rate of profit than the rest.
We have also seen (in the section on Absolute and
relative surplus value) that there is an impulsion on every capitalist to
raise the productivity of labour. Though there are other ways he can do this,
historically and in practice it has been crucial to put more and more machinery
(fixed capital) behind the elbow of each worker in order that they can produce
faster and cheaper.
There is therefore a tendency for the organic composition of
capital to rise over time in those branches of industry where labour saving
equipment can be applied, and therefore in the economy as a whole.
Here is an illustration of the capital intensity of modern
capitalist production, taken from a newspaper article (Mark Milner, Guardian April 17th 2007).
The General Motors plant producing Astra cars at Ellesmere Port is to be
revamped:
- The
plant will employ 2,200 workers
- Productivity
is likely to rise by 30%
- The
plant will produce 180,000 cars a year
- Investment
will be 3.1 billion Euros (round about £2 billion)
So each worker will produce nearly 90 cars a year on
average. (Of course no worker produces a car single-handed. It is a team
effort.) The machinery behind the elbow of each worker is getting on for
£1,000,000!
This is casual and empirical but powerful evidence as to the
correctness of Marx's analysis of the dynamics of capitalism - the connection
between rising productivity and a higher level of exploitation, the increasing
scale of production and the greater mass of dead labour relative to living
labour applied in the production process as the system develops.
Marx goes on to specifically link this rising organic
composition with the tendency for the rate of profit to fall. "With the
progressive decline in the variable capital in relation to the constant
capital, this tendency leads to a rising organic composition of the total
capital, and the direct result of this is that the rate of surplus value, with
the level of exploitation of labour remaining the same or even rising, is
expressed in a steadily falling general rate of profit. (We shall show later on
why this fall does not present itself in such an absolute form but rather more
in the tendency to a progressive fall.) The progressive tendency for the
general rate of profit to fall is thus simply the expression, peculiar to
the capitalist mode of production, of the progressive development of the
social productivity of labour." (ibid. pp. 318-9)
See:
The Marxist theory of Crisis - part 1
The Marxist theory of Crisis - part 3
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