This British perspectives draft document (2008), agreed on February 3rd, has been issued by the Socialist Appeal editorial board as part of a wide-ranging discussion about the likely development of events in British society. Such a document is not a blue-print, but an attempt to understand the underlying processes at work in Britain today, and how these will be reflected in the class struggle. The document will be discussed at the Socialist Appeal conference at the end of April.

The Labour Party:

The Blair-Brown government.

124. Tony Blair came to power with a project. The project was nothing less than to destroy the Labour Party in a realignment of the centre-left through a deal, up to and including merger, with the LibDems. The ‘realism’ of the project was based on the perception that Labour would never again win an outright majority, presumably because the working class was supposed to be in the process of disappearing. What was required was a coalition with the LibDems to introduce a form of proportional representation. This would have two advantages: coalition politics would exclude the Tories from office as they would always be opposed by the combined forces of Labour and the LibDems (only a minority of the electors have ever voted Tory, even in the Thatcher landslides); and, more importantly, the forces of militant Labour would always be in a minority with no clear means of expression within the ‘natural’ centre-left majority. Never again would the Labour Party be threatened by being taken over by the left! Now Blair is gone, and so is his project. It is a measure of the political ‘realism’ of the right wing that all their political calculations were based on a monumental misunderstanding of the balance of forces in British society.

125. So Blair failed in his aims. But he got away with a lot. The remaining democratic structures of the Labour Party have been dismantled under his rule. The ability of the ranks to citicise and change policy, and their representatives along with it, have been made much more difficult. Membership of wards and GMCs appears pointless. What role do they have in the decision-making process? At present the LP does not even pretend to be democratic. Is this irreversible? No. The trade union ranks will move to reclaim their party. After all they have nowhere else to go.

126. It is not true that the election of Labour has made no difference to the working class. The partial restoration of union rights at GCHQ, the introduction of the minimum wage at a very low level and various other reforms are testament to this. Even Brown’s complex means tested system of benefits has made quite a difference to families at the bottom of the heap. But it is significant that these gains all date from the early days of the first Blair government from 1997-2001. In fact most of these measures were put in place as Party policy by Blair’s predecessor John Smith. In general the Labour government has pursued a neoliberal trajectory, a continuation of Thatcherite policies. Since those early reforms, the only thing Labour has got going for it is that, for most people, living standards have continued to rise as the economy boomed. This also enabled a period of increased spending n health and education.

127. Brown replaced Blair determined not to have to face an election campaign for leader. Brown’s ‘triumph’ was a dirty victory of machine politics, only made possible by the compliance of the Parliamentary Labour Party, and indirectly of the trade union leaders. Now Brown seems determined to soldier on till 2009, unelected by a single person. For many the whole process must have deepened disillusionment and cynicism in mainstream politics.

128. At the time of writing New Labour seems to be in meltdown. They are ten points behind in the polls though, of course, that situation could be recovered. But it seems that every move they make drags them deeper into the mire. They are bombarded with accusations of bribery and questions about donations that they cannot answer. This is not a question of personal peccadilloes. For New Labour corruption is not personal; it is institutional. Brown leads the way. Everybody who knew anything about it begged him not to let Metronet loose on the tube. He arrogantly overruled Livingstone and landed us all with a £2bn bill. He has left us and future generations with an insupportable burden of £170bn for mad PFI schemes. This is all part of New Labour cuddling up to big business. The logic is that we, the taxpayers, are taken to the cleaners by capitalists incapable of developing the productive forces, but dependent for profits upon looting the state.

129. New Labour shows a basic lack of competence, for instance in losing the  personal details of millions of recipients of child benefit. The administration can now do nothing right. We hear echos of arold Macmillan as to what brings harold  HHH  HHH

Harold Macmillan on what brings governments down, “Events, dear boy, events.” The Brown administration is acquiring the same taint as the lame duck Major government. What is going on here? On the one hand the ruling class are gunning for Brown. The goof in losing CDs in the post was blown up as a major failing. Certainly the issue is important to people whose details have been ‘lost’, nobody knows where. But it is now clear that significant sections of the ruling class have decided that New Labour is on the point of exhausting its usefulness.

The trouble is, the ruling class is not normally a unified conspiracy. It works through a number of institutions that determine policy and  form opinions. They cannot unify or finesse their efforts. Though trying to weaken Brown, they cannot guarantee a Tory victory.

130. It remains the case that, with the Tories utterly discredited in 1997, the ruling class was very happy with the Blair administration. It ran the country in their interests when the Tories could not. But now New Labour comes across as tired and unpopular. They realise it’s time for the Tories to come back.

131. Blair came to office as the most popular Prime Minister ever. He left office ten years later as a tainted figure. When Brown came to office, many Labour supporters pathetically hoped he would be different. They hoped rather than believed that his natural Labourite instincts had been gagged by the requirements  of cabinet government under Blair. He left them little time for a honeymoon. He immediately declared his adherence to the entire ‘neoliberal’ agenda of the past ten years. As to the commitment to replacing Trident and to commissioning a new generation of nuclear power stations, both long term decisions that are genuinely controversial for British capitalism, he was clear. These were to be railroaded through without even the pretence of consultation promised by Blair.

132. Brown presented himself as a new start, as a straightforward man untainted by spin. We now see that was all spin. He abandoned an election because he thought he might lose. In doing so he was seen as weak as well as devious. This apparently minor tactical error has sent Labour support in the polls into a tailspin. This shows that the government lead was not based on wholehearted support. It was conditional, based on a perception that the government displayed a minimum level of competence, and that the economy and living standards continued to grow under their stewardship. Brown then told us he needed time to show us his ‘vision.’ He seems completely tongue tied till he has considered how his words will go down with a handful of swing voters in a few marginal constituencies.

133. It seems New Labour have finally been rumbled by the electorate. The next election is some way in the distance. It is by no means certain that Labour will lose. That depends on the performance of the other main parties and, above all, what happens to the economy. But the turnout will continue to decline as more and more voters react with disgust to the behaviour of politicians. Abstentions in the Labour heartlands are likely to prove their downfall. This mood will only harden when the government is perceived to have failed, above all in the management of the economy, when it stops delivering rising living standards for most.

134. To us it is hardly surprising that the government should look so discredited. Our earlier perspective was for a much faster disillusionment and crisis. Most comrades will be surprised they have got away with it for so long. Likewise Brown had a few months to show the Labour ranks he was ‘different,’ that he was ‘listening’, that he was ‘one of us’, in contrast to the sheer squalor of the Blair decade. He has blown it.

135. The occupation of Iraq may seem a background issue. This is in contrast to the movement of opposition in the USA. From a position where the anti-War movement was weak at the outset, anger and outrage against the Bush regime has steadily grown. By contrast, the movement against the invasion of Iraq here began with the biggest demonstration in British history. The fact that this mood met no expression in the official political process, was shrugged off by the Blair clique, and above all was not articulated by the cattle who make up the ranks of the Parliamentary Labour Party, led to a progressive demoralisation of many supporters of the anti-War movement. What else did they have to do to ‘make a difference’? The impression is given that Tony Blair ‘got away with it’. After all he has now left office and is poised to make millions on the American lecture circuit. In fact the distrust of the whole political process has been a permanent change in the scene in Britain. A contempt for politicians, the idea that ‘they’re all the same’ and declining interest in even walking a few yards to vote are all long term changes provoked by the War and the way the government ignored public opinion.

136. Brown is not seen as the instigator of the illegal War. But he is up to his neck in the lies that took us to war, lies that have acted as a corrosive acid upon the political process ever since. The Iraq adventure has been the bloodiest fiasco in British foreign policy for a hundred years. It is bound to have long term consequences for British politics. But the ruling class got rid of Eden as Prime Minister after the Suez adventure. What does it say about the mechanisms of the ruling class that they cannot even send out the message that the Iraq adventure was worse than a crime – it was a blunder?

137. To many on the left the casual insouciance with which New Labour apparatchiks send working class youth to pointless deaths in Afghanistan and Iraq is, quite frankly, shocking. Though New Labour seems to believe Britain is once again in the era of Palmerston, ready to send soldiers to the ends of the earth, they are unwilling to pay for them or to provision them adequately. The armed forces are competely overstretched, involved in two wars in Iran and Afghanistan. The loyalty of the garrison towns, traditionally conservative, is being stretched to the limit.

138. It is true that Brown has indicated that British troops will be coming home from Iraq at some point. At the same time he has been careful to show that this is not a display of independence, but that his masters in the USA have agreed to the withdrawal. Simultaneously he seems to have committed British soldiers to remain in Afghanistan for as long as it takes, which could be for ever.

139. To this discontent must be added the fury in the ranks of the police against New Labour. To save peanuts, actually just to show who’s boss, the government refused to honour the 2007 pay arbitration award. In retaliation the Police Federation is now demanding the right to strike. The incident shows the debasement of the political process. Most police authorities had already budgeted for the increase. This was actually the last pay settlement of 2007, not the opening shots for 2008. Home Secretary Smith turned the award down because she is a political nonentity with no independent power basis. She wanted to crawl to Brown, who retains a Treasury mindset. At the same time Straw invokes legislation against the Prison Officers’ right to strike.

Now they have made a prop of the bourgeois state furious with them. New Labour demonstrates its incompetence from a bourgeois point of veiw. It should remember it may need to rely on these people’s loyalty one day.

140. Brown’s prime advantage as Prime Minister is that he is seen as the man who presided over ten years of growth as Chancellor. As we pointed out in the section on the British economy, this is myth-making. Brown was lucky to be in charge of the economy when nothing went seriously wrong. His reputation and that of his government for  bringing ‘an end to boom and bust’ will be exposed as a sham with the next recession in the next year or so. This is all the more likely if the recession is coupled with a financial crisis accompanied by government incompetence, as seems very likely to those of us who have followed the Northern Rock story so far. Vince Cable, interim leader of the LibDems, was quite right to call for the nationalisation of this failing bank – in the interests of British capitalism as a whole. After all, the Tories under Thatcher took over the Johnson Matthey Bank for just £1 when it foundered in 1984. It is characteristic that Brown, Darling and the rest of them are so anxious to grovel to individual capitalists such as Branson that they may end up making the financial crisis worse for capitalism as a whole.

The Labour Ranks

141. The John McDonnell campaign, by contrast to the squalid tale we have outlined above, was exemplary as a means of taking the issues in British politics out to the active layers, including the trade unions. Significantly a layer of inactive members was revitalised and a number of ex members rejoined the party. Certainly John raised his profile as leader of the left in the PLP, which could make him a nationally known and important figure in the future.

John McDonnell MP

142. It is certain that the presentation of a fresh alternative in a leadership election, together with the combined bumbling and arrogance of Brown in public debate would have had its effect. It is significant that it was the trade union ranks who were most strongly up for a campaign for John as leader.

143. The other aspect brought out by the campaign  was the sheer cravenness of the Labour MPs, and the number of unthinking careerists on the payroll vote, who were pressured into nominating Brown in such numbers as to prevent any chance of a contest. At present these people feel free from the threat of deselection. Since the counter-revolution in the Party they are unaccountable to the membership. As with the Tory MPs after the fall of Thatcher, they are incapable of criticising and developing a fresh approach, even to save their own seats.

144. It has to be said that the campaign showed that the left wing of the Parliamentary Party is in numerical decline. Candidate MPs are severely scrutinised and vetted by the bureaucracy, and the views of left wing constituency parties contemptuously overridden. So there has been no intake of left wing Labour MPs for over a decade now.

145. Although the development of the main left trend around the LRC was undermined by the failure of the John For Leader campaign to reach fruition, it is significant that regional, city-wide and even constituency LRC groups have been established. These may become a catalyst for local left wingers.

146. Many constituency parties are shells, dominated by aspiring careerists. In parties where there is a rank and file presence, they mostly consist of older, tired loyalists. Though it is probably true to say the LP is at an unprecedentedly low ebb, in fact passivity is the normal condition of the local parties. This is still more the case since the Blair era. Blair made it quite clear that he believed that an active Party was unnecessary. He believed he could win elections on his own with a PR machine. He lost no opportunity to kick the ranks in the teeth, ignoring democratic decisions and constantly arguing against the basic traditions and aims of the movement. It is no wonder that the local parties emptied out as the loyalists felt despised and ignored.

147. To say that local Labour Parties have not been vibrant political hubs for most of their history is similar to saying that most workers in trade unions are not on strike most of the time. Local party meetings are tedious events dominated by fundraising, irrelevant-sounding council business and intimidating jargon. Most people are able to get a life without all this. People will only become involved en masse if they see an urgent need.

148. Certainly reaction against right wing sell-outs by a Labour government in the past has not usually called forth a blaze of resolutions, debate and disagreement among the ranks while the government is still in office. Historical experience shows that discontent is more likely to take the form of dissidents tearing up their cards or lapsing into inactivity. The reasons for this are complex. Most Party members maintain a residual loyalty to ‘their’ government. They do not want to be seen as rocking the boat and giving aid and comfort to the enemy. They hope against hope that Labour will at last produce a rabbit out of a hat. They console themselves that ‘at least they’re better than the other lot.’ This has certainly been the case in the years of disillusionment since 1997.

149. It is actually after the Labour government has been booted out that the reaction is likely to begin. When the activists have been out on the knocker in the election and have been rejected night after night, they will have cause for reflection. They will find themselves unable to answer the criticisms of the Labour government they heard on the doorstep. In 1951 Labour lost (with more votes than the Tories and the biggest vote for Labour ever) after six years of the only ‘successful’ Labour administration. The Labour ranks saw a missed opportunity, and they were right. We saw a huge movement in Victory For Socialism, and later the Bevanites in the local parties. In 1970, and again after the 1979 election defeat, we saw the ranks take steps to rearm the Party. This is when Labour is most likely to swing left once more.

150. The Labour Party was dominated by the right wing in the period of the post-War boom, when capitalism could afford reforms and the Labour leadership were able to take advantage of that fact. There was a vigorous Bevanite movement in the constituencies, but it never seriously threatened the leadership in the 1950s, which relied on the block vote wielded by the right wing trade union barons at Labour Party Conference. It took the economic crisis of a later period after the end of the post-War boom to produce the beginnings of a mass left wing which seriously appeared to threaten ruling class privileges. The difference with the 1950s politically was the swing of the trade union tops to the left within the Labour Party.

151. Harold Wilson, Prime Minister from 1964, was the Tony Blair of his time. To the ‘old fashioned’ notion of class struggle and taking from the rich to give to the poor, he contrasted a programme of the ‘white heat of the technological revolution’, an essentially meaningless phrase that suggested that all classes could gain with rising productivity. Wilson’s government in 1964-70 was a massive disappointment coming after 13 years of Tory rule, dominated as it was by balance of payments crisis, a devaluation that did indeed devalue ‘the pound in your pocket’ and cuts in government spending.

152. His government produced a collapse in the Labour machine and an emptying out of local parties. His defeat began a process of renewal within the ranks.

153. The left reformists launched an ‘alternative economic strategy.’ They won victory at Party Conference for a programme of nationalising 25 top firms, which was included in the 1974 Manifesto. This was a vague and not well thought out, but radical, proposal. It was intended that these 25 firms should act as leaders in their industries and guide the others into directions that, as capitalist concerns, they did not want to go. The ruling class found it threatening as, if implemented, the appetite might increase with eating. The point is: the policy was accepted by the Party leadership. They had no choice. They were riding a mood where, not just party activists, but millions of workers knew the country could not go on in the old way. During the 1974 election, veteran right winger Denis Healy also promised as future Chancellor to ‘squeeze the rich till the pips squeaked.’

154. So the 1974 Manifesto was much more left wing on domestic and economic issues than the famous 1983 Manifesto, which was denounced by the right wing as the ‘longest suicide note in history.’ And Labour won on that Manifesto in 1974.

155. The Wilson-Callaghan government of 1974-79 was a still greater disappointment to the rank and file than the previous Labour administration. It was a crisis government sandwiched between the 1974 and 1979 world recessions, and confronted with inflation of more than 20% for much of the time. The Labour government, despite the left wing rhetoric it felt necessary to use to gain election, was solidly right wing. It introduced successive rounds of wage restraint (called ‘incomes policy’), allegedly as part of the fight against inflation. The 1974-79 government was successful in engineering the biggest fall in working class living standards since the Second World War. Three rounds of the ‘social contract’ were imposed with the connivance of the trade union tops. The government was also humiliated by the IMF, which forced it to shred its social programme in 1976, after yet another sterling crisis. Finally in the winter of 1978-79, wage restraint broke down and a revolt of low paid workers, dubbed the ‘winter of discontent,’ broke out. Labour duly lost the 1979 election and Thatcher came to power.

156. This was when the left came closest to capturing the Labour Party. There was a huge movement from the ranks to call their representatives to account. Tens of thousands became actively involved in the attempt to reclaim the Party. Reselection of recalcitrant MPs was the order of the day. The leader was to be elected by the Party as a whole, not just the MPs. The formula was an electoral college, with 30% of votes for the party activists, 30% from the PLP, and 40% from the unions who had founded the Party in the first place.

157. The ranks also wanted their say on policy. Labour became committed to a unilateralist foreign policy for the first time. This seemed audacious but, as we have pointed out, the 1983 Manifesto was less radical on domestic policy issues than that of 1974. The former leader of the left, Michael Foot, became Party Leader after Callaghan resigned. In 1981 Tony Benn came within a whisker of defeating Denis Healey for the post of Deputy Leader in an election conducted by means of the electoral college. The right wing then split to form the SDP. It seemed the left was in charge for the first time ever.

158. But that was not really the case. Though Shirley Williams and the extreme right wing had broken away with the aim of splitting the core Labour vote, they left behind key right-wingers like Denis Healey. These people were determined to sabotage the 1983 election campaign and show that Labour couldn’t be elected on a left wing programme. They succeeded. Neil Kinnock took over from the hapless Foot after the 1983 election debacle and began pulling the Party back to the right. At the same time he was wiping out the democratic gains of the 1979-83 period.

He lost two more elections, but bequeathed the Party leadership to John Smith.

159. After Smith’s untimely death, Blair staged his ‘neoliberal’ coup. The ranks were by now shell shocked by the third electoral defeat in a row. They would accept literally anything that would achieve another Labour government. The layers of activists had by now subsided or gone quiet. The left challenge was mainly at an end – killed by the lie that left wing Labour was unelectable. Most of the ‘soft left’ (such as David Blunkett!) had gone over to a position of ‘new realism’ by the mid-1980s. The right wing ran the Labour Party unchallenged. That remains the position today. The Party itself was emptied out, apart from a brief period of euphoria when Labour was elected in 1997. It did not take Blair long to disillusion this new intake. A revival of militant activity among the Party remains our perspective for the future, probably after an electoral setback as we have explained above.

The Tories

160. For the Tories Thatcherism was a huge success. They achieved successive Parliamentary landslides, though all with 43% or less of the popular vote. Thatcher introduced some of the methods later taken up by Blair. This included relentless centralisation of the decision-making process in the Prime Minister’s office and the exclusion of any role for the party, secret briefing against dissidents and banishing opposition into outer darkness. When Thatcher fell, the weakness of this approach became apparent. The system promotes yes-men, who are incapable of thinking for themselves and adapting to a new political situation. The Parliamentary Tory Party was dominated by weak, venal mediocrities, people incapable of expressing an opinion unless they had been programmed beforehand, and a vicious bunch of cliques. The Tories stumbled on in office under Major, with no vision or perspective. Then came meltdown in 1997. They did not know how to cope with this. They did not know how to take on Blair, who seemed fresh while they were stale and covered in sleaze. Thatcher’s methods had become an instrument of the Tories’ downfall. The comparison with the PLP under Blair is clear for all to see. Blair surrounded himself with mediocrities. When New Labour becomes vulnerable, as it will, we shall see how inadequate these people are.

161. The defeat of 1997 was quite traumatic for the Tories. Over eighteen years of government they had developed considerable hubris. Ministers imagined they could dip their hands into public funds with impunity. New Labour Ministers should note that this disease of government seems to be infectious. But the expulsion of sterling from the ERM in 1992 destroyed the Tories’ reputation for economic competence. It is quite likely the unfolding financial crisis could do the same for New Labour. After Black Wednesday, the Tories were done for.

162. The response of the Tories to the 1997 defeat was to retreat to their heartlands. A handful of Conservative activists demanded they campaign on law and order, immigration and Europe, policies of great interest to Tory doctrinaires but less important to the rest of the electorate. Leaders such as Hague, Iain Duncan Smith and latterly Howard seemed to be conducting a holding operation, keeping faith with their declining membership in ‘middle England’ rather than trying to win elections. Any hope of electoral gains seemed to be based on the Labour government making mistakes.

163. The election of Cameron as leader, and his promotion in the press, is a sign that the ruling class now wants the Tories (the most successful conservative party in Europe) to once again set about trying to run the country. Cameron is attempting to move his Party, not without hiccups, away from the wilder shores of the right towards the ‘centre ground’. He has a slight problem. Squatters have already occupied that place in British politics. How does he differentiate himself from New Labour without placing himself back in the hands of the Tory lunatic fringe?

LibDems

164. It is quite likely that the LibDems will hold the balance of power after the next election. They are a party that faces both ways. It is rightly said that we have a three party system in Britain. But in English constituencies, there are usually two parties that matter. In solid Labour areas, the LibDems have usually emerged as the main opposition party as compared with the discredited Tories. In such areas their policy is to position themselves as a second line conservative party. In backward rural areas, where the Labour movement is a less significant presence, they position themselves to the left of the ruling Tories.

165. This ambivalence poses a problem when it comes to formal or informal coalition in Parliament. Should they side with Labour or the Tories? That would depend on the concrete situation, including the Parliamentary arithmetic. It would be difficult for them to go into coalition with Brown. Assuming the election was held in 2009, he would have been Prime Minister for two years without a single person voting for him for the job. He would be seen as an imposter. The election would inevitably be seen in part as a referendum on his premiership. In any case, if he had led Labour to electoral defeat, helping to squander the landslide of support they had in 1997, Brown’s position would be under threat from the Parliamentary Labour Party.

Or should the LibDems side with the Tories? In either case a part of their electorate would regard the decision as a betrayal of the policies they had fought for, so the situation would be very unstable, and the LibDems themselves riven by differences and splits.

Scotland and Wales

166. The Scottish National Party came to power in the Scottish Parliamentary elections last May, though they had neither a majority of votes nor of seats. In no way was that a vote for Scottish independence. This was a protest vote, a thoroughly understandable protest vote, against the miserable record in office of the Scottish Labour Party. The SNP’s hold on office might seem precarious. The opposition parties have made it quite clear that they will vote against a referendum on independence. So this proposal has been kicked into the long grass. But Scottish independence is the SNP’s reason for existence!

167. In reality the SNP was elected on a clever package of reform proposals that positioned them quite clearly to the left of Labour. The electorate took the proposals seriously and elected the SNP. Within a record short time the SNP has abandoned its entire reform programme and come out plainly as tartan Tories. They are pleading financial constraints and throwing the burden of change back on to the local authorities. A commentator might think these shameless political chameleons would be out on their ear in short order, but that would be to reckon without the conduct of the Scottish Labour Party. The Wendy Alexander baksheesh case is blatantly illegal and seems to be only the tip of a very big iceberg. The rottenness of the Scottish LP is the only thing that might allow the SNP government to survive.

168. In Wales, regarded by the Labour Party as its own one party state, the LP has been forced into coalition with Plaid Cymru. The vote for the nationalists is still less a nationalist vote than that in Scotland for the SNP. Once more it is a protest vote against the ruling Labour Party in Wales. The Welsh LP has implemented some minor reforms. For instance it is taking hospital cleaning back in house. This has already led to a reduction in deaths from MRSA and other hospital super-bugs. The administration is trying to cut down on PFI contracts and has abolished prescription charges. Some Labour Assembly members talk of putting ‘clear red water’ between themselves and the Westminster government. They see the need to differentiate themselves from Brown’s government, if only to keep hold of the Parliamentary seats in Wales. Their main problem is that the Welsh Assembly has very little power to improve things for working people.

Conclusions

The next election

169. We cannot predict the results of the next election at this stage. It is probably unwise even to try. In the first place Brown has signalled that the election will not be held before 2009. If he were forced to call it earlier, that would be because he was in trouble. This would be on account of some sort of governmental crisis we cannot foresee now.

170. Secondly the result depends on the unfolding of the next recession, and on the performance of the other main parties. We know a recession is coming, but we don’t know when or how deep it will be. We have indicated that, overlain as it is by the credit crunch, it could be quite soon and quite severe.

171. Realistically there are three possible outcomes:

·        Labour maintains its overall majority in Parliament

·        There is a hung Parliament with no overall majority

·        The Tories win with a workable majority

Let us take each hypothetical situation in turn and consider what would be the significance of each one for perspectives.

172. Labour wins: At the time of writing it seems inconceivable that Labour will get more votes than in 2005. So even if Labour were able to form a government, votes and seats would have been lost. There will be economic crisis and crisis within the government. Backbench MPs are bound to compare Brown’s record adversely with the electoral record of Tony Blair. Even in this, the best situation for him, Brown would be seen as a loser. The Blairite sniping would increase in volume. More importantly Labour’s right wing would be exposed. The reason most Labour supporters have accepted policies from the leadership that are indistinguishable from the Tories is because they were persuaded it was the only way to win elections. They would see that they watered down their policies to no purpose. With a small majority, the left wing within the Parliamentary Party could have an impact on British politics way beyond its size. The way would be opened to a swing to the left within the Labour Party as a whole.

173. A hung Parliament: This is actually quite a likely prospect. This would be a nightmare for all the main parties. Even the LibDems, who have longed for a hung Parliament for decades as the only way to give them the power they think they deserve - the bargaining power to go for proportional representation and a new political dispensation - would be torn apart by the pressures. Could they align themselves with Labour, who would be perceived as the party that lost the election? Could they be seen as flouting the electoral will? On the other hand are they willing to be co-opted into what is likely to be quite a brutal anti-working class Tory programme?

174. For Labour the pressures on them would be so much worse. Brown would definitely be seen as an electoral liability and the plots against his leadership would begin immediately. More important, a hung Parliament gives a small unified group of MPs immense power to obstruct right wing policies and to make their presence felt. The Campaign Group of MPs could raise their profile in the country enormously, and become a significant force within British politics as a whole, not just a Parliamentary group But they have to be prepared to grasp the nettle. Their stance and high profile could in turn galvanise Labour supporters into activity, now they saw an alternative to the right wing.

175. The Tories would be licking their wounds after an unprecedented fourth election defeat. They would be contemplating the prospect of remaining away from the levers of power for almost twenty years. Recriminations would be bound to follow. The Tories have shown no compunction in sacking leaders who they feel have failed them and their ambitions.

176. The Tories win: Although the Tories have been out of power for quite a long time now, folk memories of the Thatcher era persist. Advanced workers would be nervous and suspicious of them – and they would be right. The Tories would be determined to show who’s boss after such a long period out of power and would be looking to be put the boot in. A Tory victory would mean a turn to industrial class struggle.

177. All these various possibilities have two things in common. First, though we have been cautious as to the timing and severity of the next recession in this document, the next government would be governing in hard times. Secondly they are likely to be a weak government. This is a very unstable situation for British capitalism.

 178. Next May, there will be various local elections. These may not be of any great significance in themselves. But they will be closely scrutinised for what they mean for the national political scene. In particular both Brown and his critics will be looking out for whether he can be regarded as a vote loser. The results could even help make Brown’s mind up as to when to call an election. They are likely to provide quite a good forecast of a likely election result in 2009, though the economic situation could deteriorate and transform British politics in the meantime. Brown’s caution could in fact prove fatal to his premiership, and complicate the course of politics in Britain in the process.

179. The London elections by contrast will not provide us with an accurate picture of the national mood. In the first place the Tories are running a buffoon as their candidate. Secondly Livingstone has his own power base. He is not just seen as a Labour politician running for office in London. He has succeeded in distancing himself from the disaster of the 2008 Labour government.

Perspectives and the Labour Party

180. The issue of party funding is up in the air. The issue has arisen because of actual or suspected corruption arising from big donations by millionaires. So ‘naturally’ the finger is pointed at trade union donations to the Labour party, donations that are voted on and are part of the tissue of the Labour movement. Brown has indicated he might be prepared to give this source of finance up, despite the near-bankruptcy of the Labour Party. At the moment the offer is only a bargaining counter, a ‘clever’ debating point against the Tories.

181. What would it mean if it went through? Would this change the fundamental nature of the Labour Party? The constitution of the Labour Party is unique to Britain, apart from attempts to export it abroad by British emigrants to foreign lands. The Party was actually created by the trade unions. In the same way whether the Labor Party in the USA lives or dies is mainly dependent on whether it is picked up and supported by a significant fraction of the trade unions.

182. Workers’ parties in many countries are naturally linked in policy and membership with the trade union movement. Such is the case in Germany and Scandinavia. But these parties do not have a federal structure with affiliated trade unions, as the British Labour Party does. The dissolution of that structure through the ending of the funding mechanism would be a setback. But it would not change the basic nature of the LP. It would not change its nature as a working class party, defined by its mass base. We have seen how the trade union leaders naturally look to the Labour Party in Parliament to protect the working class. They do so because that is what their members expect. There is simply no alternative.

183. We have seen the fiasco of the split in Respect. Further back in time we saw the Scottish Socialist Party splinter and lose its position in the Scottish Parliament. However right wing the leadership of the Labour Party remains, all the political movements of the working class are bound to find reflection in the first instance through the Labour Party. This basic ‘law’ of the British class struggle was laid down by Ted Grant over fifty years ago, and is just as true today.

184. We have entered an unstable period. That makes exact prediction difficult. We have gone through a difficult period in the past few years. The period ahead of us will be much more favourable. Let us make sure we take advantage of it.

British Perspectives part 1

British Perspectives part 2