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Arms spending is vast. In 2008 global arms spending will be a record
£561 billion. This is seventeen times as much as the world spends on famine
relief (£32 billion). Obviously spending so much money has its effect on the
world economy. A central plank of the theory of the Socialist Workers’ Party is
the theory of the permanent arms economy. Mick Brooks looks at the view of
classical Marxism on arms spending and assesses the SWP’s theory.
The arms race is not a new phenomenon. The years before
the First World War saw a tremendous build up of military spending. This is commented upon in Lenin's work
'Imperialism, the highest stage of
capitalism'. Lenin, however, confined himself
to discussing the military/political imperative to pile up state
expenditure on armaments in the epoch of imperialism. He did not discuss the
effects of this spending upon the economies of imperialist nations.
Rosa
Luxemburg
The first
major discussion of this question is in Luxemburg's book 'The Accumulation of Capital'. Luxemburg analysed
Marx's reproduction schemes in Volume Two of
'Capital'. By 'correcting' them, she saw the major problem of capitalism as
being a tendency towards a relative overproduction
of department two (consumer) goods. Capitalism hence needed to conquer
non-capitalist sectors to find markets in order to overcome the problem of
realising surplus value locked in these consumer goods.
In the chapter 'Militarism as a province of accumulation' she claims that taxes upon working class people and
intermediate layers drive down their
standard of living in order to provide an additional outlet in the arms
sector for profitable accumulation by the
capitalists. This is a particularly unsatisfactory chapter. Even if we
accept Luxemburg's premises, taxation of workers to hand the money over to
capitalists clearly represents a simple transfer of purchasing power within the
capitalist economy. This does not solve any 'realisation' problem, except in so
far as taxation falls upon layers outside the capitalist economy such as peasants.
Bukharin
This approach was opposed by
Bukharin in his 'Economics of the Transformation Period'. He denounced
"the monstrous theoretical constructions
that draw conclusions about the beneficial (!) influence of war on national economic life". Bukharin analysed war production as 'negative expanded production'.
By this he meant that war production
was waste production for capitalism as a whole which "narrows the
basis of social production". Capitalists engaged in production of war
goods are paid the usual rate of profit. So, by racking up the national debt
there occurs an accumulation of paper tokens and securities not backed up by
marketable goods that lead to inflationary pressures.
After World War II
Since the Second World
War there has been an unprecedented peacetime level of government spending and an
enormous boom. Keynesian illusions have fed
in to Marxist writings suggesting that increased government intervention
caused or maintained the
post-War boom. One form of
this approach is the theory of the `permanent arms economy'. Joan Robinson (a
Keynesian economist critical of Marxism) argues in her introduction to Rosa
Luxemburg's 'The Accumulation of Capital' that armaments should be treated as
providing an "outlet for the investment of surplus... which, unlike other
kinds of investment, crates no further
problem by increasing productive capacity". Early formulations of the theory by Natalie Moskowka and Walter J. Oakes
and T.N. Vance (both the latter believed to be pseudonyms for Ed Sard) made
heavy use of Keynesian concepts. Both saw the central
cause of capitalist crisis as the tendency to overproduction.
This however, was not Marx's view, for the
"restricted consumption of the masses" is a
permanent condition of capitalism. The early Russian Marxists argued against
the Narodniks that capitalism did not
restrict but created a market in its development through switching an ever-increasing proportion of total
production towards capital accumulation, so swelling the market for
capital goods. Lenin, for instance, argued in
'A Characterisation of Economic Romanticism', that "it is precisely
the in periods which precede crises that
workers' consumption rises". While, of course, not denying the
tendency for capitalism to restrict the workers'
consumption to the narrowest of limits, for Marx the level of income of
both workers and capitalists was determined by the accumulation of capital. His
theory of the business cycle is linked to
the increasing organic composition of capital and resulting tendency for
the rate of profit to fall. Overproduction is merely a form of appearance of
capitalist crisis.
Tony
Cliff
The first
major British formulation of the 'permanent arms economy'
was by Tony Cliff in 'Socialist Review', 1957. He states "The basic cause
of capitalist crises of overproduction is the relatively low purchasing power
of the masses compared with the productive
capacity of industry." He goes on to conceive the state as providing a market to syphon off this
surplus and provide economic
stability. Kidron, another proponent of the theory, corrects him -
describing this as a "pre-Marxist formulation". Kidron's work, though, is not free from concessions to
Keynesianism. Dealing with the dangers of a build-up of productive
expenditure he states "it would lead to such a rapid build-up of the
capital-labour (value) ratio, to use one
mode of expression, or such a low marginal productivity of capital, to
use another, and to such a low average rate
of profit as a consequence...". However, Marxist concepts
(capital-labour ratio derives from Marxism) and Keynesian concepts (marginal
productivity of capital) are not interchangeable.
Baran and Sweezy
Perhaps
the most well known writers who have attempted to fuse Keynesian and. Marxist
are Baran and Sweezy. Their book 'Monopoly Capitalism' deals with a rising
surplus as the central problem of capitalism,
rather than a falling rate of profit. Baran and Sweezy's concept of a
surplus is quite different from Marx's. For them
the surplus is "the difference between what a society produces and
the costs of producing it". One important means of absorbing this rising surplus is through militarism. They comment,
"with idle men and idle machines as normal features of monopoly capitalism, advanced bourgeois thought,
thoroughly steeped in Keynesian
doctrine, knows perfectly well that additional government
spending, no matter how wasteful the result, raises income and profits." They see the limits
of the effectiveness of arms spending as
provided by the more highly technological nature of military outlays
(employing less people) and the dangers of
the arms race to the continued existence of the system and humanity.
To analyse
the actual effects of arms spending on the modern economy in Marxist terms we need first to look at Marx's
definitions of productive and unproductive labour. It is
because bourgeois economic theory lacks such a distinction that they have not discussed the economic effect of arms spending.
For the individual capitalist of course militarism is a province of accumulation like any other. For Marx,
"productive labour...is wage
labour which produces surplus value for the capitalist". Note that
the nature of the use-value produces is irrelevant. Nor is productive labour
confined to material production, as Adam
Smith thought.
However, we have to differentiate between the viewpoint of
the individual capitalist and that of
society as a whole. The value of a commodity or of social production as
a whole can be broken down into three
elements: - constant capital, variable capital and surplus value. Surplus value can be accumulated or unproductively
consumed (spent as revenue). For simplicity's sake we shall call the latter 'luxury' production (production of elements of
uncapitalised surplus value). Though the worker employed to produce luxury goods is producing surplus value and is
therefore a productive worker, for the system as a whole that revenue is being unproductively used.
How does state spending fit into this
picture? The general Marxist position is that this
comes from the surplus. But don't workers pay
taxes too? "Taxes, a matter that interests the bourgeoisie very
much but the worker very little. What the worker pays in taxes goes in the long
run into the cost of production of labour power and must therefore be
compensated by the capitalist" (Engels 'Housing Question'). So, though
taxation can undoubtedly raid workers' living standards in the short term, in
the long run wages represent the value of labour power. This being the case,
taxation necessarily falls upon the surplus.
The state undertakes expenditures necessary for the
capitalist system as a whole. These
'running costs' are generally unproductive for the system as a whole
(with the exception of productive industries
nationalised by the state) though they provide
lucrative fields of accumulation for particular capitalists. The cost of these expenditures represents a deduction from the surplus value.
The next
question is, how are these expenditures paid for? They can
be paid out of taxation or through borrowing - increasing the national debt.
The national debt consists of paper Marx described as 'fictitious capital'. This he counterposed to real capital, i.e.
of real assets (consisting of values) which can represent a claim on surplus value
produced. Fictitious capital is not itself
a value but represents a title to surplus value nonetheless. Clearly the piling up of such titles without a counterpart
in marketable production can lead to inflationary pressures, as Bukharin said.
Our general conclusion is that
state spending, including arms spending, is
a drain upon the capitalist economy, slowing down the rate of accumulation. But what of the argument
posed by Marxists influenced by Keynes, that government spending on arms
could 'prime the pump'? First, we argue that since the central problem of
capitalism is in overcoming the tendency for the rate of profit to fall, mere
provision of a market is insufficient to stimulate
capitalism. Secondly, throughout the period of the post-war boom rates of
capacity utilisation have been higher than
inter-war; indicating that this tendency to stagnation is not an adequate theorisation of the problems of
monopoly capitalism. So arms are a drain on the system, not a
stabiliser.
Michael Kidron
A more substantial defence of
the theory was presented by Kidron in `Western Capitalism Since the War'. He analyses
three effects of arms spending on the
economy. First, he mentions that militarism has a dampening effect as we
have described above. Secondly, he states that arms spending increases the
market for `end' goods. The real question though, is whether this is the central problem of capitalism in crisis.
Kidron's terminology is not always clear, but he introduces
the tendency for the rate of profit to fall
into his analysis. He goes on to
assert thirdly that "luxury production has no effect on the rate of
profit," quoting von Bortkiewicz and Sraffa. So he regards arms production
as a ‘leak', permanently offsetting the tendency for the rate of profit to fall.
Why should arms production have this
effect? Clearly the nature of their
use value is irrelevant here. It is true that arms represent
element of uncapitalised surplus value, hence `luxury goods'. But there are plenty of other luxury goods which presumably Kidron would not argue have this
effect. It is not quite clear what he
means by a `leak'. Kidron uses gold production
as an example of such a `leak' existing in Marx's time. However, this was not Marx's view. He
regarded gold production as a `faux
fraix', as a necessary expense of the system and hence as a deduction
from the total surplus value.
Kidron goes on to quote Sraffa as saying
that the role of arms in the system is "passive". But all commodities are ‘passive’.
Constant capital passes its value
unchanged to the final product. Only using labour
power has the property of producing new value and surplus value. This is not
the same as the capitalist spending variable capital on the purchase of labour
power, as Kidron's co-thinker Harman thinks.
Though
the word ‘passive is not entirely clear, Kidron seems to be saying that arms
don’t enter into the cycle of reproduction, either as capital goods or as
subsistence goods for the workers.
This is true of all commodities
that are elements of uncapitalised surplus value (‘luxuries’).
Marx's schemes of simple reproduction,
often referred to in these discussions,
after all, assume that production is carried on at the same scale, i.e.
that no surplus value is accumulated. In one of these schemes Marx isolated a
department 2b confined to producing elements of uncapitalised surplus value
(luxury goods).
It is beyond comprehension how commodities
produced for profit do not participate in
the equalisation of profit rates. Certainly Marx's view was that they did: "Insofar therefore as increasing productivity in the luxury industry reduces the
number of workers, which a certain quantity of capital employs, it
reduces the amount of surplus value, hence
all other circumstances remaining
unchanged, it reduces also the rate of profit...But since the rate of profit in this system enters
into the equalisation process of the
general rate of profit just as much as that in any other sphere,
increased productivity in the luxury industry
would, in the case under consideration, bring about a fall in the general rate
of profit (Theories of Surplus Value, Volume
3).
The transformation
problem
Kidron's citation of Sraffa
and von Bortkiewicz takes us back to the 'transformation problem’. In Volume 3
of 'Capital' Marx points out that commodities are sold not at their individual
values, but at their price of production, a
modified value. This is because of the
different organic composition of capital in different sectors of
production. This means that equal-sized capitals would produce very different
rates of profit if commodities were sold at their values. "Capital
withdraws from a sphere with a low rate of profit and invades others which
yield a higher profit", hence forming
prices of production in which each
sector shares equally in the total surplus value according to the capital outlaid.
There is a voluminous literature on the 'transformation
problem’. See: Reclaiming Marx’s Capital: A Refutation of the Myth of
Inconsistency for our view. Marx is accused
of transforming outputs into prices of production, leaving 'inputs' untransformed. Von Bortkiewicz 'corrected'
Marx by taking up a three sector model of simple reproduction (where
luxury goods form the third sector) and using simultaneous equations to
transform inputs. But very often in his solutions total price differs from total value and total profit from total surplus
value. Marx was quite clear that total price must equal total value and total
profit equal total surplus value.
Von
Bortkiewicz's solution indicated that
luxury production does not enter into the determination of the profit rate. Sraffa comes to the same conclusion.
Sraffa is a modern Ricardian, who shares the master's belief that the rate of profit is 'pre-existing'. Ricardo directly
identified the rate of profit with the rate of surplus value and saw changes in the latter as the only cause of changes in
the former. Marx's point about luxury production is that it influences the rate
of profit through the amount of surplus value or through an increase in
the organic composition of capital in that
sector. None of these critics use Marx's method. In particular, the assumption of simple reproduction
and the use of simultaneous equations make it unsuited to analyse the
accumulation process - where changes in the organic composition of capital and
the rate of surplus value necessarily take place over time.
Ernest Mandel
The 'permanent arms
economy' is also discussed by Mandel in his influential book 'Late
Capitalism'. In his usual eclectic manner Mandel isolates three
alternative causes of crisis and discusses to effect of arms production on each
in turn. First, he takes up the so called 'realisation' question
(overproduction of consumer goods).Mandel argues that, as
production becomes more capital intensive, capitalists experience more and more
difficulty selling consumer goods. Can a turn to arms spending syphon off this
surplus, since armaments do
not enter back into the reproduction cycle to increase productive capacity? Mandel concludes that this would only be possible
if the arms sector had a declining
organic composition of capital, and therefore counter-balanced the overall
tendency for the economy to become more capital intensive. Clearly this is not
the case.
Secondly, he argues that the 'realisation problem' would only be
overcome if arms spending were
financed entirely from surplus value. Mandel also denies this, contrary to what we have argued above.
He then turns to the effect of arms
production on the rate of profit.
Arguing, wrongly as we conceive, that arms are partly paid
for by taxation upon wages, he argues that the effect is contradictory. On the
one hand the 'raid' on wages will raise the rate
of surplus value. On the other hand, since arms have a higher than average
organic composition of capital and they participate in the formation of
profit rates, then they will tend to reduce the rate of profit throughout the
economy. He quite correctly argues that, in
denying the participation of luxury goods in the establishment of profit
rates, Kidron has confused production and
reproduction. This point can be made in Marx's own words, "The
piano maker is a productive worker, but not the piano player... The piano maker
reproduces capital. The pianist only exchanges his labour for revenue."
He also
defends the method of Marx against the authority of Sraffa and von Bortkiewicz, to whom Kidron appeals. A
point worthy of note is
that that Sweezy's presentation of von Bortkiewicz's
first 'solution' of the transformation problem involves identifying luxury
production as gold production and treating that department as a ‘numeraire’(a unit of account against which all other
commodities are measured, so its price of production is assumed equal to its
value). Hence, by definition, luxury production will not affect the rate
of profit. Harman (whose contribution is discussed later) can recognise
problems in von Bortkiewicz's method, though he accepts the conclusions.
Mandel at
some points seems to be adopting the standpoint of
Baran and Sweezy and others within the Marxist
tradition who have bent under the pressure of Keynesian ideas. Mandel
sees arms spending as setting in motion unused resources at first, but then
developing a momentum of its own and
starting to eat into surplus value, that is to redistribute it towards arms production.
Mandel concludes that arms
spending does not dampen accumulation but hastens it and is not capable of
permanently offsetting the tendency to crisis inherent in capitalism. However,
the logical process by which he comes to this conclusion is far from clear.
Chris Harman
A more recent defence of the theory of the permanent arms
economy, and a reply to critics, is Harman's
'Explaining the Crisis'. He deals first with the issue of unproductive
consumption and the rate of profit. He takes up the transformation of values into prices of production
through the flow of capital from sector to sector
in search of higher profit. This tends to
equalise the rate of profit throughout society as a whole, based on
total capital outlaid. So a more capital intensive sector will have a price of
production higher than its value.
He
points out that if a rise in the organic composition
of capital takes place in any one sector it will lead to a change in the prices of production throughout
the system. He then goes on to deal
with second order, feedback, effects of these price changes on the
system as a whole. If the organic composition of capital in the luxury goods
sector increases then, "the prices of
luxuries and armaments are now higher of course, but none of these feed back into the production process at
the next round of production - so there is no further increase in production
costs to push down the rate of profit yet further." Note that in this
passage arms are not unique but merely one form of luxury production. Their price of production is seen as responding
passively to dynamic changes in the rest of the economy. We outlined Marx's view on the effect of luxury
production earlier. It remains to apply it to the `second order' effects
outlined by Harman.
But
it is quite wrong to start with an increase in the organic composition of
capital, as Harman does, and then examine its effects on relative prices
through the formation of prices of production. Capitalists do not increase the
organic composition of capital, and so incur more costs, for fun. The reason
why capitalists lay out relatively more on elements of constant capital, raising the organic composition of capital is in
their search to raise the rate of surplus value. They seek a super- profit by raising the productivity of labour.
Thereby they can sell their commodities above their individual value but
still cheaper than the market value prevailing in that sector at a particular time. So for a time they can make that
super-profit.
As soon as the new technology is
generalised, a new value and rate of profit is established on the basis of the
new standard technology. The innovator’s rate of profit falls back to the average through a price war
reducing the value of the commodity.
The long term effect of
raising productivity, then, is a fall in prices. The economic effect of this
price fall depends on the use value of the commodity produced. A reduction in the value of elements of constant
capital will reduce the costs of these commodities to capitalists. A
reduction in the value of wage goods
(elements of variable capital) will raise
the rate of surplus value. As is well known, these are two of the most
important factors Marx mentions as offsetting the tendency of the rate of profit to fall.
The
significance of luxury production is that it does neither. The arms sector is a
technologically dynamic capital intensive sector. Capitalists in the luxury
sector also strive to raise the productivity of labour. In doing so, they
necessarily raise the organic composition of capital. The
raising of productivity in that sector therefore reduces the price of luxury
goods and the number of workers producing
luxury goods. This means that the mass
of surplus value in society falls and with it the overall rate of profit
(this smaller mass of surplus value will express itself in an identical
quantity of products). In fact this effect is one of the reasons why the
tendency for the rate of profit to fall will
not be indefinitely offset by its counteracting tendencies.
Harman is
therefore quite wrong to start with a rise in the organic
composition of capital, and move on to how it affects relative prices through the transformation of values into
prices of production. He takes no
account of the fall in the price of
luxuries, which would be expected to accompany the rising organic
composition and rising productivity of
labour in that sector.
He is in
effect assuming that the rate of surplus value is
constant, unaffected by developments in the luxury sector. Yet the aim of the
capitalist in that sector in raising the organic composition of
capital is to increase the rate of exploitation.
In terms
of Harman’s analysis, first the increase in the organic composition of capital
in the luxury sector will increase the organic composition overall in the
economy. So the economy-wide rate of profit will tend to fall. Secondly, since
the luxury sector now has a higher organic composition of capital, with the
equalisation of profit rates the prices of production of luxuries will rise. Assuming the government still
wants the same amount of arms, it will have to pay more for them. For the
system as a whole, this represents an extra cost. In other words the change in
relative prices will further reduce the rate of profit in the economy as a
whole.
This 'mechanism' is Harman's principal
innovation. He reasserts the position that the
transformation of values into prices of production can be done without total
price being equal to total value and total
profit equal to total surplus value. However, this does not seem to be a
materialist position (Where does the value or surplus value come from or go to
if they are different?). It opens the door to notions
of profit upon alienation.
Harman has an able appendix dealing
with the limitations of theories of government
spending as a cause of crisis. The trouble is
that the 'permanent arms economy' is just such a theory. In his appendix
Harman points out that government deficits ballooned with the onset of crisis. This raises an extremely important point. Is government spending an independent
variable governing the rate of capital accumulation, or is it, on the
contrary, dependent on the rate of capital accumulation? Did it cause the boom or was it a product of the boom? This is in
turn raises an old discussion on productive and unproductive labour.
Adam Smith saw a proliferation of unproductive workers as an obstacle to the onward march of capitalism. For Ricardo, however,
the question was whether the growth of the productive apparatus could
support the unproductive edifice. (see the
Chapter on 'Gross and Net Revenue' in Ricardo’s ‘Principles of Political
Economy and Taxation’)
Summing up
Clearly arms spending does
react back upon the economy. We have analysed it as an enforced reduction of
the funds available for accumulation. This is not to say that if the burden
were lifted accumulation would automatically
speed up. That would depend on the
profit-making potential for capital. Proponents of the `permanent arms
economy' have partly seen arms production as a drain, but then have emphasised
its (alleged) offsetting effects on the tendency for the rate of profit to
fall. However, arms production also acts to
reduce the mass of profit and so should be seen overall as a drain and
not a boost for the system.
Theorists
of the 'permanent arms economy' have always been careful to distinguish the contradictory effects of
different levels of arms spending upon different
economies. They see the German and Japanese
'miracles' as being in part pushed on by their much smaller level of arms spending. This in turn they see as
pressuring the more militarised economies to disarm. There is thus a
contradiction between arms competition (surely a misuse of the scientific term)
and non-arms competition within capitalist economies.
Similarly, they note
that there is a declining technological spin-off to the rest of the
economy as arms production becomes more specialist and less employment is created as arms production becomes more capital intensive.
Finally, they have never seen
arms spending as a conscious device for stabilising the economy, even though
they believe it has that effect. They quite accept that armaments spending was
undertaken for non-economic means.
The fact
remains that arms spending as a proportion of GNP in the major
capitalist economies peaked in the early 1950s. For twenty years after, the
major increases in government spending has been on social expenditures and
transfers.
What of their perspectives? In 1957 Cliff offered three scenarios – disarmament, pressures leading
to slump along inter-war lines, nuclear war and the destruction of humanity or socialist revolution. A continuation of massive arms spending together with a return to
mass unemployment was evidently ruled out. Kidron believed the 'leak of
arms spending is the key and seemingly permanent offset to the tendency of the
rate of profit to fall.' Reality has proved them wrong.
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